runcon tips — authorized SELinux-context literacy
runcon helps authorized labs sample SELinux context/domain-transition literacy on hosts they own. Pair with getenforce-tips, selinux-tips, semodule-tips, ausearch-tips, aureport-tips. Prefer lab VMs — never force context transitions on foreign hosts without permission.
Snapshot
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Surface | runcon tip checklist (user / role / type / range) |
| Job | Authorized SELinux context-transition literacy |
| Peer | getenforce-tips |
| Peer | selinux-tips |
| Peer | semodule-tips |
| Peer | ausearch-tips |
Tip checklist (authorized only)
- Confirm you may run
runconon the lab host (syllabus box you own; transitions need policy that allows them). - Prefer documenting who / why / ticket before any domain transition — never escalate production contexts without change control.
- Record short factual notes; quote short Evidence (user:role:type:range labels — never secrets or foreign process dumps).
- Optional: mode peer → getenforce-tips.
- Optional: module peer → semodule-tips.
- Prefer disposable lab VMs for
runcondrills; quote non-secret context labels afterward as Evidence. - Prefer syllabus-approved target types — refuse unauthorized privilege-escalation cookbooks.
- Stop at literacy — no attack or unauthorized MAC-bypass cookbooks.
Allowed framing
- Classroom labs reviewing
runcon -t TYPE COMMANDon authorized disposable hosts in Enforcing mode. - Binding short factual notes as Evidence (context labels — no secrets).
- Documenting expected vs observed domain transitions for authorized inventory notes.
- Comparing runcon ↔ getenforce / selinux / semodule / ausearch peer tip pages under one binder.
- Testing syllabus-approved transitions only when policy and change control authorize that drill on lab resources.
Scope we will not cover
- No crack/pirate/keygen via runcon.
- No intentional unauthorized SELinux domain escalation against foreign hosts.
- No secret-theft or process-context credential harvesting against hosts you do not own.
- No cookbooks that abuse
runconfor attack without authorization. - No hostile type transitions framed as exploit steps.
Beginner path (authorized only)
- Obtain one syllabus-approved disposable lab host with SELinux Enforcing and a known lab type.
- Prefer a throwaway lab VM before any transition drill.
- With authorization, run a syllabus-approved
runcon -t LAB_TYPE true(or similar); quote the resulting context label as Evidence. - Optional: peer tip pages above when the syllabus asks.
- Stop at literacy — no attack or unauthorized escalation cookbooks.
Practical notes for authorized labs
runconlaunches a command in a specified SELinux context — keep Evidence labels distinct from getenforce-tips mode drills.- Pair with ausearch-tips when the syllabus zooms on AVC denials after a failed transition.
- Process contexts may reveal roles and MLS ranges — never paste secrets into notes or git.
- Prefer documenting context labels the syllabus authorized without dumping full privileged process tables.
- Never commit SELinux process dumps with secrets to git — even for labs.
FAQ-aligned refusals (quick)
- Foreign-host SELinux context escalation → refuse.
- Unauthorized privilege-escalation / MAC-bypass cookbooks → refuse.
- Attack/credential-theft framing → refuse.
- Prefer authorized, redacted, secret-free Evidence.
- Use getenforce / selinux / semodule / ausearch peer tip pages when the syllabus asks.
- No crack or unauthorized-access framing.
For legal, authorized and educational use only.
FAQ
What is a "runcon tip" page in BinBench framing?
A checklist for authorized SELinux context/domain-transition Evidence (runcon -t TYPE COMMAND on lab hosts) on hosts you own or were given syllabus access to — not a cookbook for privilege-escalation via context switches on foreign servers.
How does this relate to getenforce-tips / selinux-tips / semodule-tips?
getenforce-tips covers mode; selinux-tips covers broader literacy; semodule-tips covers policy modules. This page zooms on a runcon tip checklist — it does not overwrite those pages.
Can I run runcon against hosts I do not own?
No. Authorization first. BinBench will not publish unauthorized SELinux context-switch drills against foreign hosts.
Does this teach attack or privilege-escalation PoCs via runcon?
No. Mentions of attack/escalation/bypass appear only as refusals. Authorized literacy only — prefer lab VMs and redacted context labels. Never teach hostile domain transitions as an attack step.
Does this teach secret theft via runcon?
No. Never paste SELinux context dumps with secrets, foreign host labels, or credential-bearing process contexts into notes. Prefer documenting type/role/user labels only.